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CENTER DISCUSSION PAPim NO. 33

DISEQUILIBRIUM SYSTEMS, INDUSTRIALIZ1\TION, AND INFLATION:

THE BHAZILIAN CASE

Don L. Huddle

July 17, 1967

Note:

Center Discussion Papers ar.e preliminary ·materials
circulated to stimulate discussion and critical
comment. References i.n publication s to Discussion
Papers s{10uld be cleared with the author to pro-·
tect the tentative character of these .papers.

_Qisequ ilibdum System_§_..,___lEdust ri.a 1 iza~_:b__o~1,
and Inflatio n: The Brazilia n Case~

I.

Introduc tion:
In the postwa:r period, the developi n['; countrie s have r;eneral ly adopted

disequil ibrium exchanr;e systems as the best means of dcalin['; with balance

.

of payments pressure s.

1

Contrary to the advice and leverai:;e e;:erted by the

Internat ional Nonetary fund and the Hestern Establis hment, 2 import restrictions, exchange control, etc., have not only persiste d, they have nultipli
ed.
Two general factors help explain this preferen ce for disequil ibrium systems:
first, it :Ls videly believed that devalua tion ,,ill accelera te strongly the
rate of inflatio n.

The fear of inflatio n per se, and the ner;ative implica tion

of_ inf lat ion for balance of payments re lief, mal:e devalua tion an unpopul ar
as ,vell as possibly ineffect ive remedy.

Second, developi n['; countrie s typicall y

view exchan2; e control as one of the few lleffecti ve" instrune nts uhich is
availab le for influenc in0 develop1 :1ent.

In contras t, the I.N.F. r;tresses that

such inr;trune nts cause distorti ons in the econony and are usually ineffect
ive
in bringin i about a forced equilibr ium in the balance of payment s. 3

Thus•

-:~Support for this and other research on the Brazilia n economy came from Van
derbilt, Rice, and Yale Univers ities over the past three years. Thanks are
also extended to Charles Frank and Stephen Resnict of Yale Univers ity for
helpful comment s.

1

rn the year 1963, ninety-o ne countrie s had restrict ions of various
types-- thirty-f ivc had quantita tive restrict ions on imports, ten had multiple
exchange rates, and forty-si x had restri.ct i.ons of other types. Dy 1965,
seventy -five countrie s vere still using Article 14, Section 2 in the I. M.F.
Charter. Source: Interna tional Honetary Fund Annual Report on Exchan7, e
Restrict ions, various dates.
2
The Hes tern Establis hment :refers to the governm ents, econ01:d .sts, and
other organiz ations in the develope d countrie s.
3

Cf. I.H.F. Staff Papers, various issues, and I.N.F., The Fund and Banl~
}l.evie1:? ..;__finan ce and Developm ent, in addition to the Charter .
-
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accordi ng to the I.H.F,, even thouch inflati onary, devalu ation
is to be
preferr ed to multip le exchan[ ;e rntes, quanti tative contro ls, ancl
other restric tions except durinz a short-r un transit ion period,
The presen t article sueges ts that devalu ation may be non-in flation
ary
under conditi ons prevai line in numerou s develop inc; countr ies.
system, on· the other hand, 1~ay be either

11

approp riate :, or

Clearly , there is not just one disequ ilibrium system.
typica lly

11

11

A disequ ilibrium

inappr opriate .

11

It is true that one

inappr opriate II system- ·-overv alued exchang e rntes and non-pr ice
ra

tioning --has predora inated in the postwa r period. L>

This cop.ces sion, hm-,eve r, is

not tantamo unt. to the ;recomm endation that all develop inc; countr
ies should seek
devalu ation as a means for adopt:in e and mainta ininr; a system with
a unitary
exchang e rate, tariffs , and a comple tely free raarket ,
In what follorn: ;, the case of Brazil is used to illustr ate so1~e
of the
conditi ons under uhich conven tional notions nay be in error.

Brazil has ex-

perime nted ·uith widely differi ng forms of e,~chanc ;e contro l which
have incorporated both price and non-pr ice adjustn c.nt nechan isms.

Between 19~-7 and 1953

overva luation and non-pr ice import rationi n were the mainsta ys
of the dis0
equilib riurJ syster:i, uhile bet1-1een 195J and 1961 fluctua ting, multip
le exchang e
rates were centra l.

Not only did the tHo disequ ilibrium systens have vastly

differi ne effects on the econom y, but the lar:::;e- scale devalu ation
involve d in
the transit ion fron non-pr ice-rat ioning to price rationi ng of
imports had a

very unexep cted inpact on domest ic prices.
systems is describ ed briefly .

4

In the next Gection each of the,

Section III attenp ts to provide an explan ation

This has been demons trated in nuiacrou s studies of individ ual countr
ies
too numero us to quote. One discrip tive study of recent vi.nta[!;
e is: I. S.
Friedma n, Foreir, n E:~chanp;e Contro l and the Evolut ion of the Interna
tional
_!:l.1yments Systera (tiashin gton, D. C., inimeo, 1950).
.,

l

•

... 3 ...

I

of t\'70 seemingly paradoxical facts:

1) tliat the sizeable clcvaluat ion in

nrazil was deflationm 7; and 2) that the fluctuatinr; , multiple e::~chonse-ra te
systera induced more rapid GNP r;rowth ub:Lle ho1.ding the balance of payments in
(forced) equUibriura ,

The final section discusses the choice between an I.M.F. ··

type system and appropriate disequilibri um systems.
II.. Backr;round and Description :
Shortly after the Second Uorld Har Drazil established
cxchanr;e rate uith fcu controls.

a

fixed, unitary

But an overvalued c:.Kchanr;e rate caused in-·

creasinr; balance of payments deficits and forced the government to choose between a sizeable devaluation and some c01:ibination of import and e}:chan3e restrictions.

Fear of inflation and a s1:epticisn that devaluation would ir:iprove the

purchasinc power of exports led to the choice of exchange control,

Although

these controls were at first mild, they bccm:1e rao:cc eJ:tensive as in 1orts con··
1
tinued to increane relative to the capac:i,ty to import.
The systen of import licensinc and rationin:::; ,-1bich supported the exchange
rate overvaluati on uas clearly

11

inappropria te."

In a previous article it was

shoi-m that the larce and increasin:::; r;ap bet1veen the official exchanr;e rate
and the scarcity value of foreicn exchange led to 1videspread short-circu iting

which reduced allocative efficiency, equity in the distributio n of forei:::;n
exchancc, and balance of paynents control, 5

In short, exchanr;e licenses

wc>.re allocated via bribes and personal favor it isr:i to importers who then sold
the imported goods at their scarcity value.

'
As a consequence , low priority

luxury imports, chiefly consumer durables, Hhich were more profitable than

5

.

See D. Huddle, 11Furtado on Exchanz;e Contr0l and Economic Development :
Au Evaluation and Reinterpret ation of the Drazilian Case, 11 Economic Develop
ment and Cultural Chan;o;e, April, 19G7. ·
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impotts of equipr:1cnt and intcrr:'.c<l iatc products, became a high proportio n
.
.
o f tota 1 imporcs. G Hithin several years these iller;al means of dispensin g

imports became so wi.clesprea d that the authoriti es lost control of the licensinr;
system and larie short-term debts accumulnt ed rapidly.

Hith an external

crisis at hand, the ueakness of the control S):Stem 1·ms self··evid ent by 1953
and the i3overnr:1.ent ber;an to sec1i·ch for rc1dically neu neans of meetinr, its
objective s.
Afte:c some c.xperi.r:1e ntat ion, the Arc1nha Plan Has adopted in October 1953. 7
Its basic features 11ere fluctuatin ::;, nultiple e,:chanr;e rates for o.orc than
half of total imports; a free

□arl:et

for capita1 and invisible s; and adjustabl e

r:1Ult iplc export rates ·phi ch distin::;ui sbed between pri.1:1e and non-prime e~~ports.

In effect, the new syste1:1 constitut ed a lar::;e-sca le· devaluati on, and discriminatory taxes and subsidies for- ii:iports and e;:ports, uhich constantl y depre ..
ciated-ap preciated accordini:; to the supply and demand for foreir;n exchange.
The official exchange rate remained unchan~ed ~t er. $18.5 per U.S.
dollar,

But no transactio ns took place at this rate.

Differen tial exchange

bonuses were added to the official rate for e,::po:rts, and the weir;htcd average
of the official plus bonus rates for e1::ports constitut ed the "cost of exchange 11
rate.

This rate applied to all imports of the r;overnmen t, certain petroleum

and machinery products, remittanc es of interest and earning on foreign capital,
and loans regi:::;tere d 11ith the Superinte ndency of Honey and Credit (the SUNOC).

6

Consuw.er durables, aG Hell as other consur.iab les, were a hir;h proportion of high absolute imports during the period. Cf. ibid., Tables IV,
V.
7
Officinll y inr;tructio n· no. 70 of sm:oc as ratified by lm1s 2lli.S and
of December 1953 an.cl January 195_5.
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n

All other imports 11ere sold at auction in conpetitive marl:ets,

u

Foreir;n

exchance was sold at auction in five basic catecories each of which was
graded according to the supposed essentialit y of the import to the domestic
e·conomy.

Cate 0 ory I was

11

hichly essential,

11

cater;ory II Has le8s essential,

etc., to category V Hhicb was comprised of lm::uries and imports similar to
goods producible dor.:iesticall y.

The rate structure. for imports, e:::ports, and

other transaction s is shown in T.Jble I.
Table II.

Selected major ir:1.ports are noted in

Hith few e::ceptions these cater;ories closely paralleled those

established , but not inplemcntccl under the earlier direct ·rationinr; system.
The apparently coi:1plex multiple-ra te systen ,1as greatly r;implified by
the operation of na1~l:et forces

9

Administrat ive discretion was lir:i.tecl to the

choice of imports for each particular category.

Hithin each catc~ory the com

position of irc1ports 1-ms deterr:1ined by the comp~titive biddinc of importers
in the auctions.

Although the authorities novcd imports fror:1 one cate:;ory

to another ovc::..· tir:1e so as to adjust the import structure to the chancinr;

requirement s of the econooy, there uas on tlw uhole a r;reat deal of stability
in the system.

10

The objectives sour;ht throui:;h the :Zluctuatini3 , r:1ultiple··ra te system were
numerous.

One ir;i_por-tant objective uas to provide a smooth flou of ir:iport-

8

Forei13n e:~cho.nr::;e ,-ms auctioned in the stocl: ezchan~es of each r.iajor city
Stoel: brol:ers c1cted as auctioneers for a
once a weel~ at a specified time.
small c6nr.iission and 1,ere not themselves allowed to purchc.1se exchanr;e. Other
brol:ers acted as a13ents for i1;1portcrs in the biddin13 and they also received a
Iraporters were not perr:1.itted to bid but
small commission for this service.
could be present to observe the biddin:;.
9
Individual currencies were auctioned separately, but thi.s conplicatio n
is icnored for the purpose of the ~resent paper.
lOThc catez.ory chanc;es uere enur:1cratecl i.n nur:1erous SID<OC inr;t:ruction s.
Usually the chanr;cs Here ninor.
.,:

..

•

, I

TABLE I
THE TOTAL RATE STRUCTURE A~D RELATIO?{SHIPS BETT,fr:EN
AUCTION RATES: OCTOBER 1953
(Weig hted Aver ages, all curre ncies , to near est
1/100
. Cruz eiro per U.S. dolla r)

Type of
Categ ory

Gove rnmen t
Buyin g Rate

(1)

Gove:cnment
Selli ng Rate

% Sprea d

from
Weig hted
Aver age

(2)

(3)

Offi cial

18.3

18.7

Coffe e

23.2

-56.9

Othe r Expo rts

28.2

-29.1

25.0

-45.6

"Cos t 6f
Excha nge"

j·

(4)

Categ o:cy
Alloe c,:::io n
to

To.:a1
(.5)

Categ ory I

31.1

-17.0

40~~

Cat.~ gory II

35.3

-

3.1

30;;

Categ ory III

36.7

.s

20%

8%

Categ ory IV

--

44.7

J.7.3

Free r'iark et

46.3

46.3

·27. 2

55.5

52.5

Categ ory V

Sourc e:

1

Comp uted from ~ata of Supe ri?te nden cia
Jane iro.

Note tha~ aucti on rates in the tab:e eq.ua::_
offic ial rate.

~~

r·
lo

0

..., .
.
Cred ito, l\.lO
ce

•

I
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TABLE II
Men tion ed in Ins truc tion 70
Summary of Prin cip al Com mod ities
on of ord ina ry'g ~so line .
Petr oleu m pro duc ts with the exc epti
Cat ego ry I
Coa l
Barb ed wir e
re1~ ti 1 i;-.: er s
Ins ecti cid es
ceu tica l proc l.uc ts
Some dru gs, che1 :1ic als, and pha rma
Ag· cicu ltur al m.:1c11incry
ind ustr ies
Mac hine ry for min ing and tann ing
Air plan e eng ines
oil pro duc tion and
Equ ipm ent for oil wel l dri llin g,
s.
refi nin g and min ing of coa l and ore
ors
Tur bine s and hydra--.:1.ic gen erat
Oth er
Cat ego ry II

Ord inar y gas olin e
Sira p met al and met al ing ots
'Min eral ore s
ceu tica l pro duc ts
Some dru gs; che mic als and pha rma
hine ry, and rail roa d roll i~g
Spa re par ti for roa d-b uild ing mac
stoc k.
Many raw mat ~ria ls~
Oth er

Cat ego ry III

Rai lroa d roll ing stoc k
Wool
Ind ustr ial veh icle s
Tex tile mac hine ry
Air cra ft
ines
Inte rna l co~ bus tion and die sel eng
als
Some drug s and che mic

tcx tflc s, sho es, pap er, glzL-;s
M:.1chi.ncry for t1lc inc.lus tric ~s of

g
rub ber, ni wel l as for road bui ldin
Pap er oth er than new spri nt
Oth er

~(in g ind us try
Cat ego ry IV · "N'ylon y2..rn ·for stoc
Veg etab le. 0il. s,
es>
rett
ciga
of
(~S
st:ri
indu
the
Mac hine ry for
sug ar, kni tted goo ds
Some drug s and cne inic als
Oth er
d in: the oth er c2.tego:::,,2.s
All oth er com mod ities not incl ude
Cat ego ry V

Sou rce:

de Moeda e Cre c.ito ,
Ins truc tion 70, Sup erih tend enc ia
de Jan eiro , Era ziL

r,

u

I

inputs of capitc.11 and intcri:ie cl:i.atc product: :; for domest ic produc
ers.

Lonr;

delays and red tape ,1ere typica l in the pre'1iou s 1icensin :_i; system,
and these
bad hindere d normal produc tion.
red tape.

Auction s c:ceatly reduced both delays and

A second objecti ve was to force equilib riun in the balance of
pay-

ments by auction inc to inportc rs only current ly- earned forei.r;n
c:~chan cc; any
chanr;e in supply and demand functio ns uould be accomo datecl by
automa tic exchance -rate adjustn cnts.

Licens:L n2; was used only to insure that in::io:rt s were

matched with the catecor y in which exchanr ;e ,ms purchas ed.
tion with the

11

law of simila: cs,

11

Third, in conjunc ~

the nultipl e cater;o ries were clesie;n ed to

offer protec tion-su bsidies to chosen infant indust ries. 11

Donest ic produc ers

. could petitio n the Counci l of SUIIOC to tramJfe r cor:ipet inc ir.1ports
to lo-wer
12
catq~o ries.
Adclecl protec tion uas · typica lly cnintec l if the produc er convinc
ed
the SUNOC that he coulcl saticfy clornesti .c deaand at a fairly compe
titive price.
In additio n, favored donesti .t procluc erc Herc able to inport inputs
in the more
essGnt ial cate;:;o ries.

Essent iality_ depende d partly also upon presume d effects

of cater;or y classif ication of a produc t upon the domest ic cost
of livinr;.

Faced .

uith the continu inr; inflati onary pressu res, the r;overnm ent attemp
ted to hold
down the cost of Hase r;oods.

A fourth major objecti ve wan to r;enera tc revenue

for the govenu: ient which could be used to promote develop ment.
11

The 11 lm1 of si.mi1n rsn referre d to all types of r:1easur es to protec
t
domest ically produce d simila rs to imports . A typica l example
was the re
classif ication of penici llin imports fr01:-i cater;o ry II to V. Hfien
the I.N.F.
express ed displea sure uith this chanr;e, the Drazili ann showed
that clor:i.es tic
firms Here supplyi nr; the home martet at a 11 coIJ.pe titive price, 11
Source :
Unpubl ished □aterial from the SUHOC (Rio de Janeiro , Brazil ).
12
The Counci l of SUI-fOC judce<l all rcqui~c sts for cater;or y chanr;e s.
It
\·7clG compris ed of officia ls of the Banl:
of Drazil, the SUNOC, ancl outside
appoin tees of the preside nt.
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These major objec tives Here by no means nlHay s consi
stent \lith one
anoth er.

For instan ce, subsid izin::i ; infan t indus try input s
and cost of li.vin 3

impor ts produ ced less reven ue for the r;ovcr nr:tent ,
and somet ir.1es confl icted
with creat ion of nc1·1 infan t indus triec.
resolv ed pra2;r .iatica 11.y.

These and other incon siste~ ncies were

Howev er, :for the most part, the autho rities Here
able

to recon cile these proble ms reaso nably well. 13

III. The I.npac t of the Neu ExcJ1anDe Syste1:1:

An· evalu ation of the aucti on systcr. 1 must t8:Le into accou
nt the unfav orable
condi tions under Hhich it opera ted.

First , e:~cha n~e reserv es c1nd z;old bad

1 lc

been exhau sted.~ ·

Horeo ver, the larz;e cor:in ercial arrea rs and forei:.311
debt
were pre cl omina
·
nt 1y s l1ort terr:1; 15 t .l1ere uas, t I1erer" ore, scam:· J.ce
way £·or exceedi n 0 curre nt e:~chn n[;e earni ncs.

Secon dly, the previ ously rir:in. s co1:u:1odity

terns of trade toot a sudde n turn i:or the ,-1orse :Ln
late J.95l:-. 16
·

Third , the

rate of infla tiori began to accel erate prior to the
reform , and place d addi
tiona l press ures on the eicha nce syste u (see Tnble
III).
Despi te these disad vanta ces the GNP z;rowt h ~ate (in
real terns per
capit a corre cted for terms of trade chanr; es) averar
.;ed 3.2 per cent yearl y post
reform as cor:ipa red to only 1 per cent pre-r eforn
(J.9Lf7 -1953) .

Nanuf :actur ing

indus try--t he leadin c secto r--ave raged 9 per cent
produ ct incre ase yearl y in

13

sec D. Huddl e ' 1Hulti ple Poli.c y Objec tives and Excha
nge Aucti ons ;i
(mime ograph ed ,mrldn r; paper ), Octob er, 1966.
1 L,

- ~old and foreic n excha nge reserv es fell from U.S.
$760 milli on in
Janua ry 1946 to only about lT.S, $1.00 rail.li on by Janua
ry 1940. Sourc e:
Bolet im SUYJDC (P,io de Janei ro), vario us issue s.
15
· Total an·em ~s and debts reach ed over U.S. · $1 billio
n by· 1953. I!2j_d.
16
They fell fron an index of 100 in 1954 to ~9 by 1955,
and then td 37
by 1957. Ibiq_.

-
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'L'AllLE III

ANNUAL ECONOMIC INDICATOR
S

Imp ort
Exch.:.1nge

Ye..:n·

R~!te .l
(% Li)

l
;J

(% Li)

Exc h,rn ~e
Rev enu e/
GFCF 6

GFCF/
Gov ernm c.nt
Rev enu es

(% Li)

(% 6)

(%)

(%)

0

24. 3

7.7

18. 5

195 2

8

0

15. 3

25. 0

12; 5

195 3

- 14

100

16. 9"

20. 0

16. 7

3

20. 6

19. 0

so.

26. 2

L,6

19. 6

20. 0

195 6

18. 9

32

25

19. 1

2L 7

20. 6

195 7

23

13

31. 9

19. 2 _

Ili. 5

45 ·

15

21. 4'

15. 0

14. 4

12

55

41. 8

37.- 6.

42; 8

40"

10

38. 2

34. 7 ·

31. 5

54

43. 7

38. 3

40. 3

195 5

195 8

"i960
196 1-

i

(% Li)

Min imu m
~-; es 5

0

195 9

1

(% /,)

Cos t
'.1li o1e~ ,ale
•of
Pri ces
Ind ust ria l
Liv ing_ 3 (ex . cof fee )
Hag e~ I+

195 1

195 4

11

Avc:: r £l _,1>e
Hon ey
S l!.l~_p}-_Y 2

30.

·······-

---

39.

41. 8

39.

23. 9

L,6.

l12, 0

49.

50. 6

65. 9

56. 8

69.

58. (Ja n.)

57. 1

77.

n/a

60 (Oc t.)

82. 6

70.

n/a

'LiO (Oc t.)

216 (.Ja n.)
0
100 (Au g.)
0
50 (Au g.)
0
0

·J

1

1
'{

l

l

~:1

l1
j

j

J
1
1
I

'l
.I

\

-

f,3.

1. Auc tion imp ort rat e aft er
195 2; inc lud es ad val ore m tar
iff s aft er 195 6.
2. D·e fine d as cur ren cy and
dem and dep osi ts in the han ds
of- the pub lic.
3. Sao Pau lo (ca pit al) .

4. Ref ers to mtd ian wag e in
ind ust ria l est abl ish me nts wit
h ann ual sal es abo ve 200 ,00
the rea fte r it .ref ers to hou
0 cr. 's unt il 195 8
rly wa~ e for pro duc tion wo rke
rs.
,
5. The mi.nirnum ,,,ag e has not
bee n pre vio usl y r.'.l ised sln
ce Dec emb er 1911l3.
6. The perc e,1t <~g es of exc han
ge rev enu e use d to purc h.:1 se
cof fee :,to cks wer e: 195 4 (36
( 9 . 8) ; l 95 7 (Ii ti • 2) ; 19 58 ( 6/i
.5) ; 195 5 (10 3.) ; 195 6
, ) ; 19 59 ( 9 3 . 2) ; 1 % 0 (1.3 • 3)
GFCF ref ers to gov ern men t fixe
d cap ital for ma tion .
Sou rce : Hon ey Sup ply : Bol etim
, Ban k of· 13r azil , v.:i. riou s d.:i
tcs; wag es 195 8-5 9 Y.c.ar_b._Q_Q_k
,____Qf__J.,,:J2Q.L___,~t;_;i_t_j_~Lcs.
ILO ((:e nev a) 196 6; all
oth er: Co: ijun ctu ra F.co nom ica,
Fun d.:ic ao Get ulio V.:n·P,as> var
i.ou s cL:itt:~s.
-

- --· -'

.

.. 11 -

real/ terms betm~e n 1953 and 1961. 17

Horeov er, dornec;t ic prices were stabili. zecl

betwee n 195L, and 1959 while a rou:3h equUib riun was forced in
the extern al
sector.
A.

Effects of the E:~chanr:;e Rcfon:1 on Dorr.est :Le Prices

One of the primary reasons for mainta inin~ the previou s disequ ilibriu
m
system was that devalu ation was expecte d to ~rcatly accele rate
the already
. . .
.
18
hir;h rate of domest ic
1.nflat1 .on.
It is indeed true that a devalu ation which
increas es the donest ic prices of bnporta bles and cxporta bles relativ
e to other
prices in the econony is certain to rair;e a price index that include
s import ables
and exporta bles as well as non-tra ded 2;ood:J.

In fact, this is the funda1n ental

mechani s1n t-Jhich initiat es the f:i_rst positiv e effect of devalu ation.

Arnold

Harber ter has shmm that a clevalu a.tion in Latin !1meric an countr
ies can usually
be expecte d to result in price inflati on of appro:d E1ately one-ha
lf the percen t
ace of the devalu ation in the short run, even thouch the waGe
rate does not
19
in!,'.:rea se.
Hoteov er, Ha_i:berr:;er c)emon strates that countr ies anticip atin1:;

a large-s cale devalu ation cannot depend upon fiscal and moneta ry policy
to
negate a devalu ation's price ir:1.pact withou t causing a serious
lapse in the
rate o f econorn. c grm-1t I1, 20
Since Harber 0 er 's estima te of dew!lua tion··in cluced inflati on was
pur··
posely conser vative and since lapses in ~rowth have been typica
l rather than

17

Source : calcula ted from data of Func1ac ao Getulio Vargas , Rio
de
Janeiro , J3razil.
13
cf. Carteir a de E;:t?.2}-·tacao E lrn.£:?_rtacaq_, Ban!~ of Brazil (TI.fo de
Janeiro , Brazil , 1953) for a stateme nt on why Brazil did not want
to de
valuate the cruzeir o.
1911
s ome Notes on Inflati on" in Baer and l~er_ste netsky (eds.), _Inf~-:!t i.Qg
Qp.<l_Grov1th in Latin /\nerica (In1in Co,, Homewood, Illinoi s, 19Glf),
pp. 319-35 2.
ZOibid ,, pp. 340-3Lr 9.
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unusua l in instanc es ,-,here standar d stab:Lli zat:Lon policie s have
been applied ,
it would appenr that inflati onary devnJ.u ations '\"lill have to be
lived Hith in
the future. 21

Fortun ately, howeve r, this conclu sion may not hold in cases

where deprec iation is undcrta Len fron a positi.o n 0£ both overva
lued curren cies
and non-pr ice inport rationin ::; for the foJ.10,-1:L°n:3 reason: 22

if a fi2~ed over-

valued exchan~ T rate is naintai ned by non-pr ice rationi n[; (ir.1port
licensi ng),
the price of inports to final users will tend to rise because
buyers of the
underp riced ir:i.port license s will find it pro:f:i table to resell
ii:1ports at their
scarcit y value rather than at the offici. al price plus sonc no;::1:1al
1:1ar:~··up.

Only

if the covenib ent :i.s able to fi;: the prices of all final ir:iporte
d consum ption
[;OOds and all domes tically produce d 2;oods uith an i1:1port conten
t uill the in·£1-atio nary ii:"tpact of: a rir.ing scarcit y value of :i:orci;:; n exchanc
e be avoida ble.
But r;overrIT Tcnts clearly lacl: the means of iup~erJe nU.n:::; a compre
hensive set of
p:cice contro ls.

Hence, althouc h some ir:i.poj:t ers r:ii 0ht be partia lly con::-.tr ained

fror.i chaq;in: ::; full scarci ty value, the tendenc y uould be in this
23
direct ion.
A simi.la r process occurre d in Brazil,

The lar 0 e-scale devalu ation Has

expecte d to accele rate the rate of inflati on, but after the e~:port
e::chanr ;e
rate deprec iated instant aneous ly by aluost L;O per cent and the
,·mir;ht ed
averal3e import rate by over 100 per cent Hithin a feu r:i.onths ,
there was no

21

c£. Harber ser, i.1?ii., pp. 330-335 for cor:iuen ts on earlie:;_ · st-abil ization
efforts in Chile. Also see Carlos Diaz l\.lej.::m dro, E::chan ~e Rate
Dcva].ua _tio!:!
i.n a Seni-I ndustr ialized Country (HIT Press, Cambri dce, Massac
husetts , 1965)
for a sur.m1ary of the stabili zation effort in Ar::;cnt ina. Brazil I
s experie nce
has been sir:iilar r.ince 196l,. The econor.1y har. been opcrati nr; at
2 lou capaci ty
and loH srm-,th rate durin:=; the stabili zation efforts .
22
Harber ser, _g_ii~., pp. JL:9-35 1, r.1.entio ns the Game possib ility.
23
They may, for e::ar.1pl e, charr;c old custor;i ers a lm-Jer price. Also,
the
covernr :ient can succes sfully bold dotm the p::.:ice of some r:iore easily
h01:1or;enous
and identif iable coods.
Sec note 33.
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appare !nt infla tiona ry ir:ipac t.

L\J.thour;h dor::e stic price s increa sed in 195l1.

relat ive to 1953 (sec Table III) the differ ence uas
negli r;ible and may be
expla ined by the follou ing facto rs:

1) an incre ased budce t defic it of the

feder al gover m:ien t; 2) incre ased lendin z by the Dant
of Brazi l to the state s;
3) trans fers to the coffe e secto r aftei: the col~a
pse of the mar!~e t in Septem ber

1954; and Li) the sizea ble incre ase in the min.in un
war;e prior to the refo11 n
(see Table III).

Gover nment defic its 1vcre partl y suppo rted by the
print inz

of mone y--the r:ioney suppl y increa sed by over 20 per
cent in 1951~.

Howev er,

both these defic its and the r:i.oney suppl y would have
incre ased by far more- appro ximat ely GO rathe r than 20 per ccnt- -if gover
nment reven ues from buyinr ;
21,
and sellin g foreir ;n excha nge had not risen so dram
atical ly. ·

In any event ,

the prima ry sourc es of infla tion in -1951; Here cor:ip
letely unrel ated to the devalua tion per se, and shoul d have accel erate d the
rate of price incre ase far
above what was obser ved. 25 '1,'hus, it uould appea r
that the deval uatio n and transition from ovcrv ~lued rates and non-p rice ration
ing to multi ple, fluctu atinr;
rates Here, on balan ce, defla tiona ry.
That the devalu ation- ·e){ch anse reform . ,,as defla tiona
ry io e~:pla ined
partly by the behav ior of impor ters durinr ; the pre.,d
evalu at ion years .

n.athe r

than charg ing the offic ial rate overv alued pluo some
norma l mar1~up, they
24
Gover nment purch ases of coffe e stoct s totale d about
$10 billio n
cruze iros; stabi lizati on· loans to state r;over nnent
s 1;vere about $G b.1.lli on;
and the bud1:.;et defic it uas avout $11. billio n. Som;c
e: Bo let i1:1 SUi-IOC
(Rio de Janei ro).
25
Gover nment defic its had been typic ally finan ced prima
rily by eniss ion
of money previo us to aucti ons. But after the Octob
er 1953 reform , r.10ney
emiss ions financ ed only about 25 per cent of the
clefic j.ts where as the diffe r-·
cnce. i.n the 3ovcr nnent buyinr ; and sell.in ['; rate of
excha nge finan ced fron L,6
per cent (in 195G) to 90 per cent (inclt1 din13 tai·if
fs in 1960) of the clefi.c :Lt.
Sourc e: ~ .

l
'

I

charr;ed approx imately the scarci ty value of the import.

In Brazil , any

tendenc y to char2;c nuch less than the scarcit y value was offset
by \·,idesp read
i· 1·1 ega 1

pay a

11

se 11'inr; o-f exc1ang
I
·
e 1 iceases
b y uinor
·
£.r: · · 1s 26
o-£icia

Import ers had to

bonus 11 to minor bureau crats which itself varied with the scarcit
y of

.
1·icenses . 27
import

The new syste171 removed these illez;a l opport unities by

shift in['; the sale of foreiu;n exchan[ ';e to an open, compet itive nar!~et.

Once

on the marl:et , the price of foreir;n exchanr ;e deprec iated sha·rply
and resulte d
in a de factc

transfe r of the windfa ll subsidi_ es of former ly favored importe ;r-s

and bureau crat.s to the r.;overn ment.

The latter t'hen transfe rred a purt of this

revenue to export ers--vi a the 40 per cent deprec iation of the
export exchang e
rate--a nd to importe rs of

11

so··cal1 .ed 11 essent ial cornr.1o d:i.ties- -cither via prefer 

ential treatl.7l ent in the auction s or total c::~clus ion froo. the auction
s.

Uhat

is worth notinr.; here is that auction s ::::;reatl y hindere d any further
attcnpt .s
.
b ureauc ra-s
t 'co e113~ge in
· b y minor
. i. 11_ega_,
28
l
r •
b .c
1 sa 1.es o~r. .exc1an
I
prorita
3e.

Nor_ could import ers (nlread y charg;Ln g scarcit y value to their
custom ers) pre
sumably gain by increas ing their narl:-up on i171ports post-de valuati
on.

By re

moving these lea!:ac;e s auction s r;reatly :reduced nuninten cl.ed 11 subsid
29
ies.
26 TI .
. t and the evidenc e are discuss
11.s poin
ed in D. Huddle , QI?,. _cit.
27
Ibid.
28
since the distrib ution of exchang e anonc the various catego ries
was
set by the Counci l of &UH0C --presum ably a r;roup immune to bribcry
-·-and uas
openly known by all import ers, malfeas ance uas l~ept to a minimum
.
29Al h
1
h
.
1
r
•
t oug1 t e scarcit y va ues oL ind.1v1aua
. . J. iaporto
.
l
l quite
.
.
c~angec
sic~
nifican tly after the devalua tior1, this Has nuch less the case
for imports
in toto. For exauple , Hhile the scarcit y vnlue of consum er's
luxurie s no
doubt increas ed, that of essent ial iraports of ra11 r:iateri als and
capita l cood_s
dir:1inis hecl, parri passu, uith · lesser and ::::;reate r ciuanti tics of.
e:::chanr ;c, res
pective ly, channel ccl to each class o[ _i.r:ipo::ts. !1s o. cori.seq ucnce,
clo;:::_c .stically
produce d goods liliich had heavy iLlport -inputs did-no t rise ~reatly
in price in
(contin ued on :folloui nc; page)

The devaluat ion-exch ange reform systena ticall:; redistri buted subsidie s
derived from the e:::chan0 e ::;ystcc.

1'!i.ndfal ls were transfer red fror:1 bureauc: rats

and favored ir:i.porte rs to the 13overrn: 1ent, inporter s of "essent ials,
porters.

11

and ex-

Because the latter groups had hir;her propens ities to save and in-

vest out of these funds (louer propens ities to consume) than the fonaer 13roups,
the multiple auction system ucis deflatio nary, 30

Governm ent revenue from ex

change operatio ns, f:or instance , ,·ms tied by lm1 to uses Hhich had a relative
ly
hir;h investme nt content-- r.;ocic1l overhead capital and loans to ar;ricul ture.
Largely as a conseque nce of the o.dded revenue, the r;overnm ent 's investme nt
coeffici ent increase d substan tially in 195l} and rer:iained hir:;h thereaf ter
relative to pre-195l~ years (see Table III).

In contras t, the savi.nr;- invcstme nt

coeffici ent of previous recipien ts of subsidie s uns probably very lou. 31

Thus

(continu ed fron precedin c pace)
price in most instance s, and in sonc cases actually fell.
Cf. Conjuct!:1,r_<;l
Economi ca Fundacho Getulio Varcas (Pj_o de. Janeixo ), v,irious issues for indivi
dual c01mnodi ty i1apod price indices for the years 1953-196 3. See D. Huddle,
.£E.. ci1=_., p, 22, Table VII, for an csti1:1ate of bribes and uindfal l profits
between 1940 and 1953.
30
E. Sohlrnen , Fle;;:ible Exchanr; e Rate;;, Univers ity of Chica1;;0 Press
(Chicaeo , 1961), arcues that the price level nay fall after devalua tion and
the removal of quantita tive restrict ions, because producti on accordi.n c to
compara tive advantac es uill amelior ate price rises.. This is true assumini3
that devnlua tion to a ne11 level of prices uill reflect the true, dynamic
com
parative advanta;: :;es better than did the overvalu ed rates. This problem is
analyzed in a follouin c section .
31
Thc eviclenc ; on this proposi tion i~: cited in: D. Huddle, _££. cit.
Althour:; h net receipts from auctioRs were used also for purchase s of excess
supplies of coffee from domestic produce rs, revenues after these purchase
r,
were sizeable except in 1955 and 1959. The rcraaind er of the revenue uent
al··
most exclusiv ely to investm ent. Moreove r, it can be ar3ued that ooffee pro
ducers were discrim inated against because they had a less favorab le export
exchani:; e rate than other eJ~portc rs. The revenues returned to then by purchase
of excess producti on merely provided a partial offset to thi~ discrim ination,
However , the purchase of c~cess stocks had the unfortun ate effect of encoura5
in~
producti on in the nore fertile neu areas lJhile just maintain inc uneconom
ic
produce rs in Sao Paulo.

- lG ··

aside fron the nore

11

equitab le 11 distribu tion of imports ,.rnd inc ones after

the reform, the devalua tion had po1rerfu l and desirabl e re-alloc ation effects
,-nJ.Cl
1. 1

. d tl
.
raJ.sc
32
'",.. .ient ancl '.1c 1 pc d ::; t .a·b :L· J.ize
·1e invcstwe
nt coe:i::u.c
·
d ome::; t 1.c
· prices.
·

A final, thour;h perhaps less importa nt, reason why the devalua tion
tended to be deflatio nary was that non-lu::: ury consump tion imports Hhich
con
stituted general cost-of· -livinr; 13oods Herc treated very favorabl y in the
multipl e-rate structur e.

For instance , wheat ,ms imported at the cost-of-

"33
exchance rate and essentia l drucs and pharmac euticals at the ~atecory I
rate.
L\t the same tir.1e, clor:1estic producti on of oany cost-of- livinr; comnodi
ties uns

encourar; ec1 by import-i nput subsic:ie s in.the auctions .

Fertiliz ers, i.nsecti.-

cidcs, and a::;ricul tural machiner y- "\·,ere included in cater;ory I at f:i.rst,
and
later shifted to an even more favorab le special auction category , Jl1.

In addi-

t:i.on, worl~ers had less incentiv e to denand un e incrense s immedia tely after
0
the
refona. 35 Thus, the e:~pccted rise in the cost··of -livinr; price inde~: Has
amelior ated both directly and indirec tly.

32

The reforr.1 unquest ionably led to a more equitab le distribu tion of im
ports. In fact, the reform was necessi tated to a great extent just in order
to quell domestic disconte nt rei:;ardin: :3 the old system. Reaction of the
public and importe rs to the new system ,,,as zenerall y very favorab le. Of
course, those ,-1ho lost wind fa 11s were in no positi.on to coraplain since they
could have been prosecu ted for their p1:evious iller;al activiti es.
33
nomestic price controls on these products were evident ly fairly
effectiv e and prevente d scarcity -value H:i.ndfal ls to direct importe rs. Cf.
Hario Henrique Sinonsen Os Controle s de Precos ·ua Economi. a Brasilei ra_,
Consulte e (Rio de Janeiro, 1961).
34
surveill ance uas evident ly fairly etfectiv e here also in control ling
the end use of the inport.
Ibid.
35
Note that the uinimum wage had not been raised for almost a decade prtor
to the sizeable increase granted in 1953. Neverth eless, no increase s were
r;ranted in 195!, (se8 Table II). Housin:=; aiicl apal'."tme nt r:.:~nts had been frozen
earlier and constitu ted another inportan t co~stra int on the cost of Living
in
the c:i.t ies.
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In succeedin ['.; years the continuo usly deprecia ting exchange rate had a
greater impact on the rate of domestic ;Jrice inflatio n than durinG the transition (see Table II) but still less thEn1 p:ceclicte d by Harberg er 's model.

That

the inflation a:cy inpact Has lar2;er post-tra nsition is not surprisi ng--mos
t
of the slack from the old system had been remo~ed.

The fact that the infla-

tionary impact uas less than could have been e1:pected , however, is explaine
d
in large part by the success of the protecti ve-subs idy rate structur e in
raisin2: the _do1:1est:ic supply coeffici ents far above those assumed to be
reasona ble by Harberc er.
B.

Incentiv es for Import- Substitu tion Industr ializati on

The rate structur e of the 1;1Ultiple auction system was probably the major
in·centiv e for industr ial 13rm-1th in Brazil betuccn 1953 and 1961.

To demon-

strate that the broad import categori es ctn<l c1 i-sci·i::1i natory subsidie s and
taxes fostc;:-e j by the ::1Ultiple _ auction systcr,,1 was "cor'rec t," ho'l•1ever, is
clearly beyond the scope of the present paper. 3G

In my opinion the choices

made were fairly sood ones clurin2; t~1e 1953 and 1958 period, nltbour;h not
'(vithout exceptio n; but several ir,1porta nt errors ,mrc r.1ade beginnin c in 1958
which
ultimate ly led to stagnati on.
The response of the ecoaomy to the neu e:~change syster:1 was quite stril-inc.

Contrary to e,:perien ces in Arr;entin a and elsewhe re durin the 1950 's a
0

JG~ full evaluati on of the optimal ity of the industr ializati on Hill
have
to await findincs uhich raay not be availa:_i le for some time. Altl10us h an
in
put-outp ut table is now in process cf constru ction for the year 1959, there
are as yet no cor;ipara tive cost data for Brazilia n industri es.
Individu al
industry studies are Lein:::; couplete cl, hmvever, :'.:or some '.:e:' sectors. T-!erner
Baer is complet ins a study of iron and stee:., ar:c: a stud-:,, i.s nou availabl
e
on the cnpital coods sect6r. Cf. Nathani el Leff, The Capital Goods Jndus
_tries in Drazil, unpubl:Ls hecl Ph, D, dissc1~ta ~:i.on, ;rrT (Ca,:ib:tid ~e, lfassach
usctts,
1966).
J,."':

i'
I,

.
-,
.
37
reces sion did not follow the ccva
,_uat ,.on.

The rate of indus trial r;rowt h

almos t doubl ed in 195l~ as compa red to 1952; and
the ai:;:tic uli:ura l secto r recover ed very stron cly from its poor showi n~ in 1953,

The Drazi lian case

suGie sts that th12. effec ts of an a;:ipro p:ciate tailo:..·
··1,1ade deval uatio n on dome stic
suppl y both in its direc t ir.1pac t ancl from tlic redis
tribu tion of incom e may be
posit ive -and larce .

In other cases , where the redis tribu tion effec ts
were

negat ive and larr;c r than the direc t i::1ix1cts on c::por
ts and impor t··com petinr ;
2;oods , as in Arr;o: -:tina, e:Lt:1c r the deval uatio n may
have been inapp ropri ate,

or there ~-./e:;:-e no poter, t ia }_ sourc es of clynan:.Lc e;:pa,1
s ion in the econo my, 38
The avail able evide nce attes ts to the power ful effec
ts 6£ the prote ction subsi dy rate struc ture.

Table s IV c1nd V shou the r;rm,t h rc1tes and the sourc
es

of growt h, respe ctive ly, of indiv idual ISIC manuf
acturi .ns secto rs for three
perio ds--1 %8-1 953; 1953- 1950; and 1958- 1962.

Table IV demon s,trate s that

gross outpu t in manu factur inc indus try (the c"iynan
ic secto r in the econom y)
grew very rapid ly, espec ially durin s th12. multi ple-r
ate, auctio n perio d (1953
to 1961) .

In Table V the growt h of the-su pply of manu factur
ing produ cts is

appor tioned amon 0 three sourc es--do r:1est ic dernm d,
expor t deman d, and impor t
subst itutio n.

Dor:ic stic deo.an d was alway s tbc dor.iin ant crowt h sourc
e; impor t

subst itutio n was necat ive betwe en 191:-9 and 1953,
but posit ive and risin g in
the final two perio ds.

Expor t deman d Has a very limite d sourc e of crm-,t
h in

all perio ds, but it was relat ively stron ger in the
secon d perio d~nd poore st
37
Cf. Cado s Diaz i\leja ndro, _££. cit.
38
cf ibid. , pp. 137-1 99, for an exar.ip le of an inapp
ropria te deval uatio n.
39
These three sourc es accou nt for total suppl y chance
, i.e. , for any
secto r; given the perio d, t~e sourc es total to l
(100 per cent) .
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T,\131.E IV

GR01-!Tll RATES OF i"tAl'WFACTURING INDUSTRY

Industry
Sector·

ISIC

1953-58

Consumer Goods

20-22

Food; beverages and
tobacco
Clothing
Wood Products
Printing
Leather Products

24
25-26
28
29

8.9
5. 1·
6.6
10.5
2.4

7.1
9.3
2.8
7.5
5.4

0.9
0.8
3.7
0.3

.1
9.2
14.5

2.4
7.5
5.7

11. 0
1.1

·10.7

9.6

7.3

In~ermediate Goods

23
27
30
31-32

Text:LlCs
Paper
Rubber
Chemicals,-petroleum
and coal p·roducts

/1

3.1

Investment and Related Goods
Non-metallic minerals
Hetals, madiinery and
equipment·

33
34-38

12.7

Total Manufacturing
Source:

1. 2

4.1

13.9

21.0

5.3

7.0

8.0

United Nations, The Growth of World Industrv, National Tables
1938-1961, Table 2B; data for 1959-1963 were calculated
from IBGE/Conselho Nacional De Estatistica, Anuario Estc:tistico
Do Brasil, 1966, Rio de Janeiro,· Brazil, p. 130. rs:c ::-::o. 1 s 2.5-26
31-32, and 34-38 were not listed in Table 2B, Unite~ ~~tions;
t~ese were calculated from vaJ.ue ~dded data above and deflated
by price indices from I"'ter"'at:ionc:l H';,-,,,,n,~-; 8 1 s~L. 8..+,
v.L 5
... +-;~u_\....;:--;,, ,,,.,,..~=-s,.,'""
,·, .... v - ...
c __.__..._
prices excluding cof :ee;- and Con1 unc :::ur::i Econonnut, s2cEoral
· price index.seriei for years after 1944.
.
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T:\l,LE V

['i,

~J

i' ~

~;mn:.ci-:s cw cr:.O\n_·ll

t:•

I;,;
)·'.'

i1

l ') Ii 9 -- 5 3

19 53 -- '33
Tmpo t-t

lSlC

romcst ic

No.

Dcu ;_rnd
1

Sub:, t:i~
r.~u~rts _

tution

Import

Domest ic
Demand

Substi 
_1:;~port_~

1:

1958 - 63

tution

Domest ic
Demand

E:-:1?_orts

r,
Import
Substi 
tution

1:

,,i,

1;

t~

i

1~c'

1,

Consum er
goads

i

1.0232

.0ll5

-.0350

.%17

.0270

.0311

.9902

·. 0117

-.0019

1.0223
1.0005

.0157
.0003

• 01+05

1.0114

.0000

-□ 028

. Ol,16
.0006

l. 0000

. 015!,
.0000

-.0033
.0000

1.0564
1.0613

.0001

.9995
.9903
1.0030
.9745

.9879

25-26
28
29

-.0380
-.0009
-.0142
-.0566
-.0563

. 9181

24

_0056
.0000

.0000

20-22

Tn l:c. e:\c'd i <'· t e
i~oods

7.3
27
30
:31-32

1. 105 7

- • 00511

-.0018

-.10111

l. 00!, 7

-.0207

.0160

1. 0 715

.0014
.0002
.0155

-.0730
-.0055
- .1914

l. 0052

1.1759

. 9311
.9202
.9659

.9%1

.8329

-.0006
.0000
<0062
.0270

. 010!;
- • 0081;

.0317
• 01,00

.0445

.0353

-.0003

.0J/15
.0060
.lll68

-.0001
.0204

.9944
. 9912
1. 0000

.0000

.0088
.0000

.9227

.0119

. 065ff

• 9811
.9003

,0231

-. 00-'12

.0000

1.0284

.0017

.099/;
--0303

• 8{,9 7

;oos1

. lL,23

r

r

[,
f

l

f
i:

G
i'.

tt
f(

r

Inve~tm cnt
and Related
goods

.8666

.0006

.1328

. 8f+29

.0028

• lSl;/f

.9105

.0018

.0877

33

. 9613

34-38

.0387

.8767

.0000
.-0008

.8859

.0000

.1224

.lll1l

1. 02 78

.7819

• 00311

.2156

- • 02 77

. 8880·

.0000
- .0020

.·0045

-."0265

• 91103

.0185

.·01113

• 91,6 7

.0082

• 01;!17

Total

i:

l. 0220

~

.1097

lf
f'
I.
I
~

I'

Source:
t.

See /lppcn<l .ix A; the met:hod olo;;y
"P,1.tt!.c rn of Indust rL,l Growth "
S. Lc'.-ds nnd R. Soligo , "Cro',Jth
19 5 4--(J/1 , "
P ;-i ki st;~!_?. _D,~ •;el op_i_nr: n t_

for the growth source c,.tlcul ation is c.d2.pted from IL Chcner
y,
h_~rJ-5: .an Ecoi10m ic Revi.e1t ," Septem ber 1960, pp. 6211-5!, , and
and Structm .·.J.l Ch;_rngc i11- Pakist, :m's 1-!anuf; icturj_n g Indust ry,
Rc.:.Y}:_0"._, Spring 19 6 5 , pp. 9 t,-139.

~
t

~

~
l

['.

~

~ -

f'.'
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in the first.

Thus, the nanutact ur:i.n;_; :;ecto:r as a whole perform ed much

better after 1953 in te1:T1s o::: out put ;:_;ro\.,tL, sub,_;t :I.tut ion for
i.i:1port s, and
export promot ion under relativ ely unfavo rable conditi ons.
These fincli.n:::;s aJ.so HeaLen consid erably the ar::;ume nts freque ntly
found
in the literat ure that the grm1th of import·· cor.1.pe tinc industr
y was miscuid ed
and poorly directe d.

Celso Furi:ad o, for instanc e, has asserte d that :Lncent ives

were r;iven to the Hron:::; industr ies and resulte d in
investm ent fn 'less essent ial' :i.ndust ri.es.

,AO

" ... the concen tration of

In contra st, " ... investm ents

in :Lnfras tructur e and the basic i~dust ries, e.c~, iron and steel,
lacced be
hind badly. /fl

It is ir:i.plied , therefo re, that the rapid gro\vth rate of over-

all manufa cturinc uas lar:3eJ.y superfl uous and 1-1astef ul.

But Furtado 's r;enera l-

ization s are incons istent w:Lth the .indivi dual cector~ l data in
Tables IV and
V.

Investm ent and related :3oods hacl the hi:3hes t cro,·,th rate of the
three

_basic sectors in all period~ , and metals , nachi.n cry and equipm
ent drastic ally
accele rated in z_ro1.,th after 1953.

In £act, in the later periods it uas the

consum er goods sector which la::>;Ged behind badly.

At a more disagg regated level,

it is also clear tba t the basic, and not less essent ial, indust
ries played
the domina nt role-··c heraica l and chemic al produc ts and iron and
steel were exceeded in value-a dded :3rm1th bet.wee n 1950 and 1960 only by the
motor vehicle s

.

industr y. '1-2

l+O"Po litical Obstac les to Econom ic Grm-/th in Drazil, :, Interna
tional
AffairE ., Vol. 41, No. 2, April 1965, p. 255. Cf. also Diap;no
sis oi the
Brazil ian Crisis, Univer sity of Califo rnia, Bcd~e ley · (transl ated
by S. Macedo ),
1965, Part-- ii:for Furtad o' s extende d discuss ion of these same
points.
1 111
~ p o 1·1.t1.ca
-· 1 ObC'..,tac.~e
1 s ... " , _op. ci·t.. , p. 256
_ .
12
' These sectors \•,ere foLL~\-1ed by electri cal machin ery,

other metals , non
metall ic and metall ic ,vorl:in:: ; rnc1chin e1?/, paper and paper produc
ts, other manu
facturin .13, non-fer rous metals, non-me tolli.c r:1ine:ra l produc ts,
food, bevera ce,
tobacco , and textile s, respec tively.
Cf. H, Daer and I Kersten ct sl~y~ "Import
Substi tution and Indust rializa tion ia Drazj_J.,-1: ArJ.cric an Econom
ic Revic'\_:'.,
l~y 1964, p. 419.

It is an incontcst:ib le fact, therefore, that the dynm:1i.c crm1th sec·
L,,.,
. 1.y 1.npon::-su)s
.
·
1 c1
' . t·u t·1.on
.
. .
f.)
tors were main
1.nc,ustr:i.es

ture clearly save incc.nt:'_vcs to these :Lnclustrics.

The uultiple-ra te strucNoto:i:- vehicles, iron and

steel, chemicals, etc., \-;c.;:-e favo1:ccl not onJ_y by protecti.on fror.1

forei~n

competition , but by e:;:chan[;G. subsidies on u1pi.tal, intermediat e, and raw

. 1 .
.
raater1.a
1.mport-:i..11pu
tr_;. /.fl,,

Horeover, these! nnd other essential sectors re-

ceived sizeable ne~ativc in1.::erest rate J.oanr; fron the [;overnment. L:-5

Thus,

althou 0 h most mnnu:focturi nr; industries uere pnrtially protected and sub-·
sidize<l, the dynanic import-sub stitution sectors were elven additional incen-

.
. t l1e r:on:1
~
' lh 1.r;
· I1er 1.Dport-1.npu
·
·
t1.ves
1.n
·
L; 6
o:c~ c I1ec1p c1~ec1·.J.t anct·
c· sub s1.· d 1.es
One further criticism of the penalty-sub sidy rate structure clarifies
a final issue.

The Economic Corm:i.issJ.on [or L;..1tin America dia13nosed the recent

L}3

The clo.sc 13eneral correlation bct11een value·-added 13rm1th in individual manufacturin r; sectors and substitutio n fo:..· ir.1port:s can be seen i.n ]3aer
and I(crstenetsL y, ~- cit., p. l,19, Table 5.
L, 4 subsidi.es i.n the motor vehicle indw;t:ry are ~lea;:-ly e::plai.ned in L.
Gordon and E. Gror.n";lers, _op_. ~it. Also, 1,10.cb.i'.1et-y imports i•Jere ouch louer
i.n terr..is of e::cban2,e co::.;t for ii:on and s"i.:eel an<l cher.1i.cal industries than
for other sectors.
LLS

· Between 1952 and 1962 the rn.etallu?: 0 ic&l industry received 25.6 per
cent of all BNDE loans; chemical_ industries received l.f.5 per cent; and motor
vehicles 2. l per cent. They 1vere the raost favored sectors. There is not
available any sector.:11 breatclown of loans of the monC?.tary authoi'.'ities .
Source; ECLA 11Fifteen Years of Econor:1i.c I'olicy in Brazil:' Econonic Bulletin
for Latin Amed.c;a, november 1964-, Table 26, p. 179.

46

Fuels were the most heavily subsj_dizecl i.nport class at approximate ly
two-·thirds the e,~chan;:,e p:.:ice of capital equipr.:.ent fo1· ar;ricultm:e --the
second most favored--anc l tHo-fifths that of constructio n materi.als-- the .
most henvily penalized. Metallic i.nternediat e soocls uere beloH the weighted
averc113e total inport rate until 1953 and thereafter exceeded it by a wide
marr;in. Fuels couprisecl 15 to 20 per cent and metallic intermediat e [;oods
5 to 8 per cent of totnl import by value f!'om 1957 to 1961. Source:
Bol'etim
·sm-~oc, various dates, and Bank of Brazil.
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1

stagnation in Brazil as primc1rily a problcn of incentives havinr.; lost their
power.

11

The whole problem,,. lic~s in the fact that restriction in absolute

terms should not last c.oo J.on 0 , so the cconor;iy can advance throu:3h various
.
. r.
•
• . L: 7
stages o f- d ivcrsiricatJ.on. ··

It is j_opli.ecl he::e that laree-scalc chanr;es

in the industrializati on proi:;rai:1 ',,ere: not underta:~eP..
taken.

This is certainly mis-

As ea:·ly as 1957-·1950 ·::he r.;ovenment shifted a large share of its

protection-subs idy incentives away from man; traditional and previously
favored infant industries to the autonotive and re lated sector::;.

Tt1rough

nuraerous inclucc::1ent::;, foreign ond doucsti.c L1vcston; increased the dooestic

. ,_ o £- t.ou1_
. 1 supp l y or mocc:?: ',re.nc_es
I. l
' ? J_n
coe.i::"£'
.
·ic1.enL
:,:::cor:1 . L:-~
r

In fact, continued crouth in

,

manufact~ri □~

r

1c:::;un
- ✓-'

0

°l

-.()

0
,()u
✓

by 196.J... Lis

aftc~ 195J w2c la::sely dependent

upon the motor vehicle industry arid its sup2liers.

The rlirect

i □portance

of

motor vehicles production bctiJccn 19::;S ~1r:.d 1SG2- :_::; evident f::on data :i.n Tables

class:i.ficat:i.on :

Th:i.s cntc2;O;:-y ua_s by f,E tLe r::.·:.,st clT1a:-::ic afte:;_- 1959 both in

stitution, and uithin th:i.t; catesory moto::..· vci1icle jWoduction alone, exclusive
of its suppliers, provicicd rour;hly over one-fourth of tl1e ::;rm,th in value added
l,C)

between 1959 and J.963, ···

The massive promotion of tbe moto:r veh:i_cle and related industries was
probably an error uhich 'had serious repercussions on· the economy.

47

The shift

nThe Grm-Jth and Decline of Iraport Substitution in Brazil, 11 Economic
Bulletin for Latin Arae;:ica, Economic Cor:imissi.on fo:r Latin America (Santiago,
Chile, Harch 196"1-) , p. 51.
48
calculatccl fro::1 2roclucti.orr clat2 in Gordon an~ Grornr:ier~, · United States
Hanufacturin~ Invest □ent in Brazil (llnvard University, 1962), p, 63; and
Anuario Estatistico, IDGE (Rio de Janeiro), various dates.
49
_rbid., and Anuario, op. cit., 1958 a11cl i9G5.

of subsidies fron trad:i.tional and Ci:t,~ly infant industries to r,10tor vehicles
after 1957 lessened tlte profitabil:i.ty and l:Lc~uidity of tbc former sectors at
a time Hhen they uere already facin 0 uorscnin::-:; done st ic te:ci:m of trade 50
Second, overall h,port rec;uirements :.1ay have been only ·maq;inally reduced,
for not only were nany inportccl accesso:;..·ies still required, but domestic inputs uere required fr01:1 those irrdustrics Hhi.ch uere pressini:; on capacity, e.g.,

_

basic metals, o.achl.nes and equipment, ancl rubber.

51

Third, the crouth of in-

vestment and 0 oods p:;..·oduction :)et,1ecn 1.959 c1nd 1963 Has 1:1uch less favorable
than the ISIC classification indicates because included in it are passenzer
autos

which made up a1.nost hnlf of the v~1luc of l'.:otor vehicle production. 52

The consur.1ption of an expensive product ui'i::h

c1

relatively lo,7 soci_al value was

en.courar;cd at the c~~pense of more traditional products; moreover, the latter
typically had e::;ccss capacity and experienced stac;nation afte:;:- 1950 (see
sumer r;oocl1; 11 in Table IV).

11

con-

Thus, the i:;overrn:ient 's reaction to anti-3ro\-1th

factors in ten:is of neu econor:iic policies in 1957-1958 i:vas unfortunate.

If

policy instrw:ients had been developed to remove the many dis-incentives uhich
constrained ac;riculture and e::ports, Hhilc r:mintainin::; incentives in the more
traditional

50

nanufactu:d.n:::; industries, the; star;nat ion mic;bt have been averted.

The terms of trade between ac;riculture and indust~ry remained fairly
constant bct\men 194G and 1954, bei:;an to rise slichtly in favor of ac;ricul
ture up to 1958, and then tu1~ned very unfavorable for industry thereafter
(from 117 in 1950 to 1.30 by 1962 fro □ a base of 100 in 1953). Soiirce:
Plano
Trienal Presidencia de Republica (Rio de Janeiro, 1963) and Conjunctura
Economica, _2.E. cit., Hay 1965.
51 cf E
· Comnussion
. . . ror
~
.,.JJa t in
. HEte'.Lica,
'
.
·. •cononic
.£2. ~. '- , p. 52, specifies
these industries uhicb had overar;es and sborta3es of installed capacity,
52
calculated from Gordon and Gromners, Of-:. _cit., p. 63.
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Instead, the rcst:cict:i on of: -mmrnfactu ;:ecl const;,~er ::i;oocls, nany o:C' uhich uere
traded to rural secto:ts (food, beve:ca;:_;es, tobacco, clotltins, \·mod, and leather
products) in e:::chan;::e for rural pri.nary i.npuU; further nccentuat ed the frac··
r.1ented, dualistic structure of tbe econoruy.

It also bad the unfortuna te con-

sequence of c:::acerbat.i .n::; the "cost-pus h:' i.nflati.on in a;::,;ricul.t ure.
C.

E::;:port

Perfo·,: □ance

and the Dal.'..rncc of :2D.yments

The author:Lt ic.s pessimism rcsardtn;;; rapid e:::port crowth durin::; the 1950 1 s
,,as justified by actual

pcrfor □ance.

:iianufactu d.n;:; productio n went almost

exclusive ly touard satisfact ion of c'cor::cstic dennnd (Table V).

Only a very

small proportioi 'l of several nanufc1ctu recl products was exported. 53

l\.s durinr,

earlier peri.ocls, tradition al prir.10.ry products cnrncd_ th,2 bull: of forei;:;n exchance;

5l~

Hoi:,evc::-, t:he ~rm!t'.1 in e::clwn2:e carnin:::;s fro:::1 these sources uas

• J. l y . _ 55
pr act 1.ca
n1.1.

A larc;e pnrt o[ the e:;:planatio n. for e::port stc1:=;natio n c2n be attribute d
to ·slow increases in internatio nal· denancl for Drazi.1-ty pe exports.
also constantl y lost :::;round in he;:- share of the uorlcl martet.
explain this loss in uarl:et sha:;:-es.

But Brazil

Tuo facts help

First, because the nuthoriti es wanted to

insure that the clor:1estic marl:e·c ,-Jas nclequatel: ,7 supplied at a lmJ pr/ce,
53

r,or e::anple, only about G per cent of total consur:te:r t3oods (mainly wood
products) , less than 2 per cent of i.nte:;:-nedi .o.te ::;oods (cbe □ical, petroleum
and coal products) nnd ·c1bout L,.5 per cent of investmen t nnd related :::;oods
(metals, machinery , and transport equi.pnent ) ,,ere e:;:ported. Sou,:ce: Bo let i.fil
Superinten denci.o. de Uoeda e Credi.to (Ri.o de Janeiro),- various dates.
5l1.

'I'ri.mary exports earned 86 per cent of total e::,change in l 9L,9 nnd 78
per cent by 1958.
In the manufactu rin::; sector, only food, bevera:=;cs and tobacco
exports incrensecl Gpp::eciab 1.y:
froi:1 lec;s tban 3 per _cent i.n J.953 to almost·
7 per cent of clor:1esti.c. j_)roductio n by 1958. ·1bicl.
55 1
.
· .
ron ore uas -c· l1e: OD l y r:w.Jor
1. .
.
e::cep:::1.011
anc1 ·.1.·.:· was nm:· a traaition
a 1 pr1.r.1ary product e;:port. Total e:~ports in ·u. S. dolla;:-s fell by about G per cenj::
betHeen 1950 and 1 %0.
Ibid.
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quantitative rcst:ci..ctions ,-mre placed on the c::port of va:cious commodities. 56
Althouch it is difficult to assess just hou

i□ portant

these restrictions

were, they undoubtedly weal:enecl the i.nccnt ivc to export.

Second, export e:v·

change rates ucrc devalued only after risinc domestic costs hnd cut deeply

.
S7
in.to the profitabi1.ity of e1:portinc;.
cleclined_before the authorities acted.

58

Typi_cally, export volume 112d c1lready
Brazil Has pessimistic re2;arclinr; ex-

port opportunities and of:£::.cials ,-Jere jY,:eoccupiccl with tbe problem, relnted
to import substitution and the appropriate ta:::c1tion of coffee.

The problem

of finding the des:_rable c::chan.-=:e n1tc for non-coffee exports was larr;ely ignorcd.

Dr<;1~ilian e::port volume and earninc;s uot.cld have iup:;:ovcd if the co1:1-

petitive positio~ of producers had been
risinc; clomest:ic costs,

]lather than

2

□aintained

in the face of rapidly

devaluation cvc,:y year or

t1-10

which

ba~·ely rcstorecl tbc p:::-ofitability of c;:portin:::;, ,-Jhich was then quicl:ly reduce.cl by cost inflation, the e::chancc rate for c;:ports should have been depreciatecl daily (-oeel:ly) either by tyin:::; it to an appropriate cost inde:c, or some

S 6E•:;:po:ci:: 1 1.censes
·
" 1 b e pro 1nui
. ' . t·eu.l to ·enc
. '
•
. or
cou.LC
quantity
consumecl in
processed in Brazil durinc the pre cc dine; year plus 7 per cent. Uaj or e::
ports ,-1hicb were prohibited f:;:-0£":1 ti1:1e to time include.cl c;orn, cotton, te:;:
tiles, tobacco and castor beans.
57
Export c::cbance rates uere dcva]_ued in 1\u:3ust 195l, (about 30 per cent
depreciation) and then a:::;ain in □ ic1-195G (about 40 per cent depreciation)
prior to the i.ntrocluction of the neu auction syster:1 in .i\u:::;ust l957. During
the entire period dor.iestic costs. rose by ove:i: O'J ?CJ: cent accordi.n:::; to the
cost of livin::; ancl wholesale p::ice incle:;cs; cy ove:: 150 per cent accordin3
to th<2 r..1inir.1uG1 \1a2;2 inJe:c:~
Thi.r3 u;:1dc~:-~;t2t2s "t.:llc need for devalllatibn because
inte:tnati.onal pri.ces for Brazilian-tyrie c~:pod:s uere c11.so falliD:::;.
SOE;:port voJ.ur.1e fell of:~ sb1rpl~r :,rior to c2cb ::-:,:port rate d2valuation,
partly due not onl:,,7 c:o non-p:rofitablc e::po;:t prices, bat also because coffee
producers applied a ::_;:;:eat deal of pressure on the e1:chan::::c authorities by
uithold in:::; stoc:~s. Cf. Ivan L2~~0s, The Effects o'..:: I:,rnz il I s Fo:cc i;;n E1~change
Polity on Her E::port:
19l':-6-6i) (llarvnrc1. Ui.-c:i_v.-:-;:s:_;:y, Er:.pub2-ir:licc1 Ph.D. disser
tation, 1962).
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si1:iilar arranr,eme nt.

59

Since even successfu l import-su b.st ituU.On industria l-

ization cannot be e::pected to continue to lo,;;e,~ the impo1·t coefficie nt--especially once non-essen tial ir.1ports have been squeezed out of the ir.1port bill of
goods (by o.id-195O 1 s in Brazil) ...;•a;.~: !'..!):port rD.tC of growth close to that of the
growth rate of the ~ross domestic product r:iay be necessary to nvoi<l a balance
of-paymen ts induced stagnatio. n. 60
In Bnizil, the available alternati ve to increasinc ; eJ:port earn:i.n.c;s waG a
large influx of foreign capital.

Favoroble e::chanr,e treatment for ir,1ports of

equipmen t, repatriat ion guarantee s, etc., produced a sL::eable influ:: of foreign
· investmen t betueen 1957 and 1962.

Hovever, as mentioned earlier, these funds

were partially r:ii::::direc ted and eventuall y did not help forestall the balance··
of-payr.ien t bottlcnccl ~ ,1hich helped foster the~ post-1962 stagnatio n 61 In fact
the increased dependenc e upon foreign imtesti:ten t and the instabili ty uhich resulted from servicinr, profit remittanc es, debt payment, and potential ca'pital
59A
., ·1··
seconcl possici
.icy
would have been to over-deva lue, but then
set an adjustabl e ta~ on exports uhich could be reduced J?.91'.:h passu uith risin,:;
costs.
6O
cf. Chenery and Strout, 11:J."o;:eir,n Assistanc e anc Economic Dcve loprnent, 11
American Econo1:1ic I:.cvieu, Septer.ibe:: 1966, pp. 679-733. Successfu l import sub
stitution is unli;:ely to subc-tcrnt: i,ally lm;er the over-all import coefficie nt
due to the necessity of i.mportin0 larr,e:: c;uantitie s of import-i:n puts as domestic
industry 13rows; r.10reover, the incor:ic 2l.1sticit y of dem;:md for ir.1ports in the
less dcvclop2d countries is p:;:-obob1y nuch hir,he,: and grm-1in13 1:1ore rapidly than
the income elast:i_cit y of demand :for their e::po1·ts in the industria lized countries .
,: 1
u~Output r,rmri:h per capita has been close to zero since 1962. InduGtria l
product actually fell in 1964-1965 . Some students of the DraziU.an economy
believe that the sta 0 nation waG clue alr.1ost entL:ely to political factors;,
cf. Baer, 2E.- ci!_., pp. 192-202. and Fu'rtado, op. cit., but econonic factors
were of perhaps equal irnportanc e, Dra:::il 's i.nport bill of Goods becane in
creasin0l y made up of import··in puts essential fol: the func-i:ioni nr, of: ·domestic
manufactu rin13 and a::;ricultu re; Therefore , the fle~~ibili ty of the structure of
fraports ,-;as ::;:c2at.ly reduced betueen 19'.;3 and 1962, uhicl1 Greatly reduced the
covernmen t 's options. Also by reclucir.::; the feasible output ::;rowth of the economy,
the bott le.necl: inc,~ccisc.d tensions bet,,ccn r.i.v8l yioi,er ::;roupG none o( uhicb
\-;as Hillin;,:; to lose its incor::e share,
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fli2)1t all constitute further ,:easons [or j:ejcctins the sounclnes[: of the
policies which proooted the ootor vehicles and related industries.
cally,
:

Paradoxi-

instead o2 reducin2; ·the balance of payments bottlenec::, as planned,

import substitutio n 11 in this im,tancc pe:rvcrscJ.y increased both dependence

1

~
·
·
· . 1 1nscaJ1
. · ·1 • ..·1 1• t y, 62
on rorei3ners
an d pocencia
Despite the poor pe;__·forr:1ance of c;:po;:ts during the post ··re:Eoro years,·
balance of pay □ents discipline ioprovcd vis-;-vis the previous period,

Both

the non-price direct rationi111:; systen and the m.ultiple··ra tc auction system
relied upon e:;:chan.c;c bu<l.c;ets.

1Jhile the incent_ives to exceed the budc;et under

the former syste1:1 had been too lJO,·IerZul to cont:tol, the proce:rn of auctioning
exchange ih a f;:ee narl:et re1:-iovecl [1ost of the incentives for e~:ceedins the_
capacity to import.

63

Deficitc, c_1s Des.sured by off·icial compensator y financing,

Here very sU.ght fror.1 1953 to 1957 even thou2;h e::chan.c;e earnings ,-,e:;_-e falU.nr;
relative to the ir:iport-inpu t needs of the econouy. 6lf

1\ftcr 1957 the tendency

to over-iraport reappeared and foreir;n indebtedncs s·becane once ar;ain critically

62 ,,

·
· ·
·
t·raeni:· b ecan to j:a
J..' ore2.cn
~ 11
privm::e
. 195 9 an d never a::;ain
inves
. reac 11e d
.. 111
the levels attained betHcen 1956 and 1958; sj_nce much of the investment was re-·
lated to the autor:iobile· industry, fo::- 1vhich subsidies were perhaps unduly hir;h,
its demise ,.,as not. entirely undesirable . /\. case ' 1for 11 the benefitn of foreign·
capital to the Drnzilian econor:iy is □aclc. in E. Bal:lanoff (eel.), Heu Perspec
tives of Brazil Vanderbilt University Pre9s (N2shville, Tennessee, 1966) .63see pa3es 13-16- a.nd note 20.
Gl:.Over-irnp ort.ation in 195L:. Has offset by surpluses in 1955-1956. Defi
cits in the fon1er year uerc due to: .1) a desire to increase capital and
interr:iediat e product j_r.1portc as t:i.uch as feasible after the drastic curtail
ment of imports in 1953; and 2) the collapse of coffee export earnincs in
late 1954 as internation al prices fell precipitous ly, Large i □ports in the
first half of the year had been in anticipatio n of ~table coffee earnin:3s. ·
The latter dropped f:rnn an inclc:: of 100 in 1953 to 78 by 195 7. - Source:
Conjunctura Economica, Fundacao Getulio wn:gas,_ 1954.
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By the early 1960 1 s forcicn indebtednes s had reached over U.~. $3
billion and repay□cnt of principle pltis inte~cst could only be net by either
ne\1 terms--a sui.tch to J.on2;er term--or la:::::;e neu loans. Cf. BaLlnnoff, .£.E· 5::it.

That the balance of

pay □ents

con,;tra in"i: uas so 1x:ll net betuc.e n 1953

and 1958, but not therc.af te:..·, points up the cliscip linary prob:Ler.:
i. of any system
of contro l.

11.ltltou gh the means for prevent in::; deficit s arc availab le, the

author ities may not be able to Hithsta nd tl:c nunerou s pressur
es \·Jhich come
into play as a risin::; demand for foreign e:~chan gc is th\Jarte cl
by a falling
f;upply,

'J.'he equilib ::ating nc!ture of a ri:::i.n0 forei:::;n e2~chan::3e price may
in

itself be too painfu l to accept:.

1:hcn the choice ic betHeen increas ing ex··

cess capac:i. ty i.n tI:c economy (and underen ployE1e n..:) nnd excess
forci13n borro1:1 i.nr;,
the price of the latter uay have to be very hi::;h indeed before
a popula r r;ovcrn -

D.

The Adjust able Pee Altern ative

The closes t bL"ood olten12 .tive to uu1ti.p le auction s Has a pe:::;ged
rate system
with protec tive tariffs .

E::chaa 0 e rates could have be.en <le.valu ed every year

or so iri. orde::- to offset risin:::; clor:iest ic prices.

Dy <lepreci ati.11:3 the sellin::: ;

rate less in 1953, and acldinc discriu inatory ad valoiec tariffs
, the penalty subsi.dy structu: ;:-e 0£ the
appro:d mate<l.

□ultiple

auction s could have been theore tically

l3ut it is doubtf ul that this system uoulcl have been adequa te.

Given the typica l tendenc y to prot2c t a peg:::;c.<l rate (e.r.;., the
e;~port rate
in Brazil ), the syster.i oay ·well have dc.2;erie rated into anothe r
round of overvaluati on and <li~ect, non-pr ice rationin :::;.

Even e~clud inc this possib ility,

the author ities had little o,. no ,basis for sett in:=; tariffs in
1953; auction s
were used precise ly as the means to deterr.1. ine the neu tariff
levels set
in the reform of 195 7. GG

I-Iulti.p le-rate auction s 1·1ere no sr:1c1ll advanta ::;e

GGHUCr.io
A
' •
.
. ct• o:ci3ina
. . 1 •!..Y on_y
l
ns I1act. b een J.ntencte
.J
as a t·empora ry r,1easur e unt l..
ad valore1; 1 tar:Lf:fs could be studied and a:::;rced upon by the2 Con:3re
ss. · This Has
not o.ccomp lishecl 1111til 1\ur:;ust 1957 ,·1hen auction s ue:re reduced
to tuo categD ries
(contin ued on fol:Loui nG page)
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because they not only blended to.'.3etli cr r.iartet :i:orccs and irrter:i:e
:cenec, but
permit ted adjustm ents in i171port structu ie ancl pricini: ; ove:c time.
Clearly , as the Interna tional Iloneta ry Fund itself insists ,
a clevalu ation to an equilib ri.ura, pe::;2;cd c~rchm,::;c rate stands or faJ.ls
on the Hill:Lni ;
ness and ability of the countr y's author ities to stabili ze dor..est
ic prices. 67
Hhere such stabili zation is ir.1posr ;iblc to achieve either because
: of politic al
realiti es, or becaus e it will result in sta.'.3na tion, the pei:;i:;ed
rate system may
be inappr opriate .
IV.

Conclu sions
i'-'lany cQuntri .es _have postpon ed clevaJ.u t ion fo:r fear that it tJOuld
c;:iuse a

rapid acceler atiori o:::: clor.1est ic :,;~ices.

Devalu ation ruod2ls suppor t tl·,is fear.

Hm·1eve:c, in some ins~:an ces 1:bc:re hc:s bcc.1 ;:i }.,1ri:;e discrep ancy
betveen uhat
these models and conven tional wisc'._oo prc,J~_c t and the actu2l
infla-.:: ionary im-pact of a devalu ation.

\/here ti1c rec~cc~ c::cbrn;: :c rate has been naintai ned only

by direct, non-pr ice 2.·ationi n::; 2nd o'.:be:: cont;_·o ls, and the scarcit
y value of
forei13n exchan.'. 3e ~1.as been r::..sin 0 , dcvaiua tJ.oi1 ,,ill not accele
rate a clor:iest ic
price inde:: by tbc cle~c;rce 0.xpccte cl; nor ~?licre the devalu ation
redistr ibutes

dieted by models ,J:ich assuuc ec;uaJ. sa·,in::: propen sities amonc
all ::;roups .

If,

as in Brazil , the cap between tho officia l sellins rate and
the scarci ty value
of c~;:chani:;e is vec:y 1.ar::;c, and the redist1 .·ibutio n effects are
vci.·y positiv e,
prices nay not be acccier ated· at al 1..

This is encoura1 3in:::: fo:..: the numerqu s

count:c ies whic~ have avoided devalu ation only by substit utinc
fo::- it inefficicnt and clumsy e::chan1 3e cont:co l systc:-:: s.

Houcvc r, it also accentU 11tes the

(contin ued fron precedin :::: pace)
. (13encr al and specia l) and .:1d valon,.1 ta;.·ii:::-'s HC're ::;2t ,1hicb
ran::;ed up to 150
per cent on value. i\uc•i:i.o ns uere not disccni::~11L~•2d altor;r"! thcr
until 19Gl and
then only ai: the insiste nce of ·U:.c Ia~:crna i:io::i.al Honeta~ :y runcl
as o. precon di
tion for stabili ~ation loanc.
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necessity of designing differrntia l devaluation s which

□a~ioize

non-infla-

tiowffy, cro1;-1t h inducin;:; effects.
The BraziJ.ian nultiple auction systeu had such trmith inducin::; effects.
Until serious errorr~ 11crc made in 1957-1958 poucr:::ul incentives Herc r;iven
to ir:1port-sub stitution industriali:; at:i.on.

Contrary to statements by sone

observers, it is not apparent that the penalty-sub sidy rate structure prior
to 1950 encouraced an inefficient process of inport substitutio n; sectoral
i:;rm·Jth within uanufacturi nc uas fairly balanced and ::,;routh sources ucre uell
apportioned bet1:een dorr:estic deDand and ir:ipo:ct substitut_io n.

Bhethcr or not

the industriali zation uas "ucll attuned II to the dynamics of lonr;er·.. run Brazilian
r;rm·rth is st ill an open quest ion.

It is true that the industriali zation did

1:1,ot create directly a :::uf:cicient nuuber of jobs.

\JhiJ.e total and urban popu

lation increased by about 3 and 5.4 per cent yearly, respectivel y, in the
decade 1950-1960, the :Lndustrial uorl: :force c::pDnded by only 2.5 pe:c cent per
year.

GO

An industriali zation based on substitutio n in investr.lent and inter-

mediate r;oods uill be capital-bia sed.

·But in the trazilian case anti-eraploy -

ment biases were cxa:=;serated unnecessari ly.

For instance, both the ne::,;lect

of the (hieb labor coefficient ) a:::;ricultu:::-aJ_ sector and the r.1assive pror:1otion
of: (capital intensive) rJ.otor vehicle and c.:1enical industj:ies liuitcd co.ployment.

The e:i.:chanse syster.1, of course, 1ms siDply the instrument throu::,;h

uhich policy decisions··-:: :;ood and bad--wcre impler.i.entecl .

It uas __unncutral

only in the sense that labor uas not a traded 1300d and could not, therefc;:ire,
be· taxed or subsid:i.z<;::cl.

68

E::chan:::;e subsidies for Ccll)itul and intcrnediat e

Employment 2;:· □ 1·Jth in ac;ricultu;:e ,ias 1.. 7 per cent per year and in
services uas S. 2 pc;: cet1t per ye.a;:. Productivit y actually :foll in the latter.
Source:
1950 and 1960 census data.

- 32 -

ir.1ports, houcvcr, tended to cli.,_,tort factor proportions in production Hhich
could have been corrected by labor subr~iclieiJ.

6)

That this uas not done re-

fleeted the lou priorit:r 1;,iven to e1:1ployucnt creation by the r;ovcrnr:1ent.
I.lrazil :nacle a conce;:-tcd e:'.'"fo;:-t to achieve sustained, r.'.lpi.d crovth under
a sever2 foreicn e::chan::;e con.straint.

Dut c,:rcn uith the relatively lar::;e

size of the domestic oar~et, adequate entrepreneurial and other resources,
croutb ceased af:ter 1962.

Hore recently, atter:,pts to pro1:10tc e~~portG, en-

courar:;e f:orcizn cc:ipita}. invcst::cent, and dir:1ic1,i::;h the l(ubitche~~--indu ccd run-.
away inflation lrnvc had, at best, li.n:i.tec! :::;rm1th-i.n<luci. n2;-effects.

An in-

efficient c::-~chancc system has been only one of the factorG e:~plai.ni.n::; the stac;nation; but it: iG clear tha"i.: the :Eoi~cic;n e:ccbanc;c bottlenec.1: has been a
cri.tfcal destabili.:::ins factor fo:c the econo1ay e::ccpt bet1'leen 1953 and 1961
uhen multiple fluctuating exchance rates uere the chi.cf policy instrur:i.entf_;.
An auction cysten uay be the best practical instrument for achievin['; a
specific set o·f policy objective.s in oti1er clevelopinc countries.

Under fairly

typical general circuustances faced in these countries (e.s., inflation, inefficient and diGhonest uinor bu:;:-caucrats, a severe balance of paynents
constraint, etc.) nulti.ple auctions sccr.1 prei:e,:uble to either over-valued
exchancc rates and direct rationin::; or pc2;::;cr.l ::-ates, ad valoren tariffs, and
reduced crouth rates.

The precise

co □:JoGition

and nur.1ber of inpo:;.-t cate:=;ories

would, of course, vary accordinc to the particular circunstances of the
country in question.
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Although

11

poor choice~;;; could have deleterious

subsidi.es for nore labor-inten.sivc production processes could have ·
been r;iven in the forn of t:m;: rebates ;:ier · mcsi.nal lc1borer added by a firm.
Abuses could be difficult to detect; ho,-Jcvc::-, ~md any such schc::.1e r.mst be
conditional upon appropriate controls. 1\ltc,.-no.tively, this consid_erotion
,,10uld not in c1ny Hay effect the criticisus of. the r;overnnent prouotion of
capital intensive activities of relativcly'low productivity.

repe/ rcuss ions on t1w econo ::q, appro r;ri.2 tc' :Ln-tc,r
S:eren ce uay often b
only alter nativ e to slow ~:co11t!.i ancl

the

Dise quili brium syste ms

most preva lent throu chou t the past two decad
es have tende d to incor porat e
the wors t elei:1 cnts of ·;:!:e a-.,ai lable a:~tc ;:m,t
ives- -fixe d of:ci cial c;~chanr:;e
rates with risin c scarc ity value s and non-p
ri~e ratio nin3 ,

A pracm atic appro acih

free from_ prcva lent <locmas i-muJ.d undo ubted ly
resul t in ir:ipj~ovccl

11

secon d best 11

syster :1s.

lOA d escri· pt ion
·
· '1 yras
. o f- c;~c I1an:::;e auc t .
an d ana
. :rn
~ un d in:
.
ions prope r is
D. Hudd le, 11Forei: :i;n Excha nce i\uctj _ons: i\n
Eva luati on 11 (nime ocrap hed worl~ inc
paper , June 1967 ). The common objec tions to
fluct uatin c rates , c.c., crea
tion of rist and unce rtain ty for trade rs and
resu ltins socia l and priva te
costs , Here not very force ful for Braz il.
Cf. also: i\lexa ndcr ICafk a, :rThc.
Braz ilian Auct ion E:-:ch an3e Systc n," llevie,;-;
o[ Econ ooics and Stat istic s,

All[;UE ',t

1956.
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Gro1-1th sou::ce:;

o·:C

rnanufacturi n 0 inclu:::try were apportioned amon2;

domestic demand, [ AJ, e::po:rt der:iancl, [BJ, and inport substitutio n, [CJ,
from the fo:!.luoin2; cc:uat ion:

[A]
,0,,,.

(1)

whc.:ce

-
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Zl
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I
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Zl

is defined as do1:1esti.c productio~1,

cloh!estic cleoancl,

[CJ

[ DJ_
I

-,I

Z

l

u

"

"·"1

z2

Zl

-·

c-2 - --)

z

J

2

as total supply,

aG doL:c:stic intc:;:r.,ccliat c clemilnd, and ··E

I

D

as

as foreir.;n

demand for e:~po,~ts, and the subscri 1)ts refer to the beginning and ending
points in tir.i.e.
The contributio n of domestic deoand and e~~port demand is calculated
by assu1:iin[; that the proportion of donestic p::oduction to total supply did
not change during the period.

Import substitutio n (liberalizat ion) is then

calculated as the change in tbe p:ropo;:-tion of donestic pi·ocluction to total
supply durin2; the period tir:1.es the most recent total supply.
The identity cquationc: on 1111:Lch .equation (1) is based a:;~e e::plained
in Leuis-Solig o, .2.J2. Eit. and Huddle,

11

1Totes on the Brazilian Industrial-

ization:., Sources of Gro·oth and Structural Change," Center Discussion
Paper No. 30 (Yale. Univer_sity, June 1967).

Drazi.lian data sources and

procedures of cot imat.i.on are clL::cuosecl i.n the latte:!'.".

